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a b s t r a c t
This paper provides a non-systematic review of the progress of forecasting in social
settings. It is aimed at someone outside the field of forecasting who wants to understand
and appreciate the results of the M4 Competition, and forms a survey paper regarding
the state of the art of this discipline. It discusses the recorded improvements in forecast
accuracy over time, the need to capture forecast uncertainty, and things that can go
wrong with predictions. Subsequently, the review classifies the knowledge achieved over
recent years into (i) what we know, (ii) what we are not sure about, and (iii) what we
don’t knowIn the first two areas, we explore the difference between explanation and
prediction, the existence of an optimal model, the performance of machine learning
methods on time series forecasting tasks, the difficulties of predicting non-stable en-
vironments, the performance of judgment, and the value added by exogenous variables.
The article concludes with the importance of (thin and) fat tails, the challenges and
advances in causal inference, and the role of luck.
© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of International Institute of
Forecasters. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
‘‘There’s no chance that the iPhone is going to get any
significant market share’’
Steve Ballmer, CEO Microsoft
April 2007
1. The facts
1.1. A brief history of forecasting
In terms of human history, it is not that long since fore-
casting moved from the religious, the superstitious and
even the supernatural (Scott, 2015) to the more scientific.
Even today, though, old fortune-telling practices still hold
among people who pay to receive the ‘‘prophetic’’ advice
of ‘‘expert’’ professional forecasters, including those who
claim to be able to predict the stock market and make
others rich by following their advice. In the emerging
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: f.petropoulos@bath.ac.uk (F. Petropoulos).
field of ‘‘scientific’’ forecasting, there is absolute certainty
about two things. First, no one possesses prophetic pow-
ers, even though many pretend to do so; and, second, all
predictions are uncertain: often the only thing that varies
among such predictions is the extent of such uncertainty.
The field of forecasting outside the physical sciences
started at the end of the nineteenth century with at-
tempts to predict economic cycles, and continued with
efforts to forecast the stock market. Later, it was extended
to predictions concerning business, finance, demography,
medicine, psychology and other areas of the social sci-
ences. The young field achieved considerable success af-
ter the Second World War with Robert Brown’s work
(Brown, 1959, 1963) on the prediction of the demand for
thousands of inventory items stored in navy warehouses.
Given the great variety of forecasts needed, as well as the
computational requirements for doing so, the work had to
be simple to carry out, using the mechanical calculators
of the time. Brown’s achievement was to develop various
forms of exponential smoothing that were sufficiently ac-
curate for the problems faced and computationally light.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijforecast.2019.05.011
0169-2070/© 2019 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of International Institute of Forecasters. This is an open access article under
the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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Interestingly, in the Makridakis and Hibon (1979) study
and the subsequent M1 and M2 competitions, his simple,
empirically-developed models were found to be more
accurate than the highly sophisticated ARIMA models of
Box and Jenkins (Box, Jenkins, Reinsel, & Ljung, 2015).
As computers became faster and cheaper, the field ex-
panded, with econometricians, engineers and statisticians
all proposing various advanced forecasting approaches,
under the belief that a greater sophistication would im-
prove the forecasting accuracy. There were two faulty
assumptions underlying such beliefs. First, it was assumed
that the model that best fitted the available data (model
fit) would also be the most accurate one for forecasting
beyond such data (post-sample predictions), whereas ac-
tually the effort to minimise model fit errors contributed
to over-parameterisation and overfitting. Simple methods
that captured the dominant features of the generating
process were both less likely to overfit and likely to be
at least as accurate as statistically sophisticated ones (see
Pant & Starbuck, 1990). The second faulty assumption was
that of constancy of patterns/relationships — assuming
that the future will be an exact continuation of the past.
Although history repeats itself, it never does so in pre-
cisely the same way. Simple methods tend to be affected
less by changes in the data generating process, resulting
in smaller post-sample errors.
Starting in the late 1960s, significant efforts were
made, through empirical and other studies and compe-
titions, to evaluate the forecasting accuracy and establish
some objective findings regarding our ability to predict
the future and assess the extent of the uncertainty as-
sociated with these predictions. Today, following many
such studies/competitions, we have a good idea of the
accuracy of the various predictions in the business, eco-
nomic and social fields (and also, lately, involving climate
changes), as well as of the uncertainty associated with
them. Most importantly, we have witnessed considerable
advances in the field of forecasting, which have been doc-
umented adequately in the past by two published papers.
Makridakis (1986) surveyed the theoretical and practical
developments in the field of forecasting and discussed
the findings of empirical studies and their implications
until that time. Twenty years later, Armstrong (2006)
published another pioneering paper that was aimed at
‘‘summarizing what has been learned over the past quar-
ter century about the accuracy of forecasting methods’’
(p. 583) while also covering new developments, including
neural networks, which were in their infancy at that
time. The purpose of the present paper is to provide an
updated survey for non-forecasting experts who want to
be informed of the state of the art of forecasting in social
sciences and to understand the findings/conclusions of
the M4 Competition better.
Some of the conclusions of these earlier surveys have
been overturned by subsequent additional evidence. For
example, Armstrong (2006) found neural nets and Box-
Jenkins methods to fare poorly against alternatives,
whereas now both have been shown to be competitive.
For neural nets, good forecasts have been obtained when
there are enormous collections of data available (Salinas,
Flunkert, & Gasthaus, 2017). For Box-Jenkins methods, im-
proved identification algorithms (Hyndman & Khandakar,
2008) have led to them being competitive with (and
sometimes better than) exponential smoothing meth-
ods. Other conclusions have stood the test of time: for
example, that combining forecasts improves the accuracy.
1.2. When predictions go wrong
Although forecasting in the physical sciences can at-
tain amazing levels of accuracy (see Section 1.3), such
is not the case in social contexts, where practically all
predictions are uncertain and a good number can be un-
ambiguously wrong. This is particularly true when binary
decisions are involved, such as the decision that faces
the U.S. Federal Reserve as to whether to raise or lower
interest rates, given the competing risks of inflation and
unemployment. The big problem is that some wrong pre-
dictions can affect not only a firm or a small group of
people, but also whole societies, such as those that in-
volve global warming, while others may be detrimental
to our health. Ioannidis, a medical professor at Stanford,
has devoted his life to studying health predictions. His
findings are disheartening, and were articulated in an
article published in PLoS Medicine entitled ‘‘Why most
published research findings are false’’ (Ioannidis, 2005).1
A popular piece on a similar theme in The Atlantic enti-
tled ‘‘Lies, damned lies, and medical science’’ (Freedman,
2010) is less polite. It summarises such findings as: ‘‘Much
of what medical researchers conclude in their studies is
misleading, exaggerated, or flat-out wrong’’. Freedman
concluded with the question, ‘‘why are doctors—to a strik-
ing extent—still drawing upon misinformation in their
everyday practice?’’
A recent case exemplifying Ioannidis’ conclusions is
the findings of two studies eight years apart of which the
results were contradictory, making it impossible to know
what advice to follow in order to benefit from medical
research. In 2010, Micha, Wallace, and Mozaffarian (2010)
published a meta-analysis that reviewed six studies which
evaluated the effects of meat and vegetarian diets on
mortality, involving a total of more than 1.5 million peo-
ple. It concluded that all-cause mortality was higher for
those who ate meat, mainly red or processed meat, daily.
However, a new study published in 2018 (Mente & Yusuf,
2018), using a large sample of close to 220,000 people,
found that eating red meat and cheese reduced cardio-
vascular disease by 22% and decreased the risk of early
death by 25% (with such large sample sizes, all differ-
ences are statistically significant). If conflicting medical
predictions, based on substantial sample sizes and with
hundreds of millions of dollars having been spent on
designing and conducting them, are widespread, what are
we to surmise about studies in other disciplines that are
less well funded, utilise small sample sizes, or base their
predictions on judgment and opinion? Moreover, if the
conclusions of a medical study can be reversed in a period
of just eight years, how can we know that those of new
1 Ioannidis’ paper is one of the most viewed/downloaded papers
published in PLoS, with more than 2.3 million views and more than
350K downloads.
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studies will not produce the same contradictions? Rec-
ommendations about the treatment of disease are based
on the findings of medical research, but how can such
findings be trusted when, according to Ioannidis, most of
them are false? Clearly, there is a predictability problem
that extends beyond medicine to practically all fields of
social science, including economics (Camerer et al., 2016;
Dewald, Thursby, & Anderson, 1986). Fortunately, em-
pirical studies in the field of forecasting have provided
us with some objective evidence that allows us to both
determine the accuracy of predictions and estimate the
level of uncertainty.
There are several famous examples of forecasting er-
rors, including Ballmer’s forecast quoted above about the
iPhone, which is possibly the most successful of all prod-
ucts ever marketed. In 1798, Malthus predicted that we
were confronted by mass starvation, as the population
was growing geometrically while food production was in-
creasing only arithmetically. Today’s material abundance
and decreases in population growth in most advanced
countries have been moving in the opposite direction to
his predictions. In 1943, Thomas Watson, IBM’s president,
made his infamous prediction: ‘‘I think there is a world
market for maybe five computers’’, missing it by about a
billion times if all computers, including smartphones, are
counted (see also Schnaars, 1989). However, even recent
predictions by professional organisations that specialise
in forecasting, using modern computers and well-trained,
PhD-holding forecasters, can go wrong, as can be seen
from the complete failure of these organisations to predict
the great 2007/2008 recession and its grave implications.
The same has been true with technological forecasting,
which failed to predict, even a few decades earlier, the
arrival and widespread usage of the three major inven-
tions of our times: the computer, the Internet, and the
mobile phone. Judgmental predictions have been evalu-
ated by Tetlock (2006), who has compared the forecasts
of experts in different macroeconomic fields to forecasts
made by well-informed laity or those based on simple
extrapolation from current trends. He concluded that not
only are most experts not more accurate, but they also
find it more difficult to change their minds when new
evidence becomes available.
After surveying past successes and failures in forecast-
ing, what we can conclude is that there is a significant
amount of uncertainty in all of our predictions, and that
such uncertainty is underestimated greatly for two rea-
sons. First, our attitude to extrapolating in a linear fashion
from the present to the future, and second, our fear of
the unknown and our psychological need to reduce the
anxiety associated with such a fear by believing that we
can control the future by predicting it accurately (known
as the illusion of control, see Langer, 1975). Thus, it be-
comes imperative to be aware of the difficulty of accurate
predictions and the underestimation of the uncertainty
associated with them, in order to be able to minimise this
bias. The field of quantitative forecasting has the potential
advantage that it may be possible to assess the accu-
racy of forecasts and the level of uncertainty surrounding
them by utilising information from empirical and open
forecasting competitions.
1.3. Improving forecasting accuracy over time
The scientific approach to forecasting in the phys-
ical sciences began with Halley’s comet predictions in
the early 1700s (Halleio, 1704), which turned out to be
remarkably accurate. Other forecasts followed, includ-
ing the somewhat less successful meteorological fore-
casts of Beaufort and FitzRoy in the late 1850s (Burton,
1986). These were highly controversial at the time, and
FitzRoy in particular was criticised heavily, and subse-
quently committed suicide. Nevertheless, he left a last-
ing legacy, including the word ‘‘forecast’’, which he had
coined for his daily weather predictions. Over the 150
years since, there has been extraordinary progress in
improving the forecast accuracy not only in meteorology
(Kistler et al., 2001; Saha et al., 2014) but also in other
physical sciences, as the underlying physical processes
have come to be understood better, the volume of ob-
servations has exploded, computing power has increased,
and the ability to share information across connected
networks has become available.
The social sciences are different. First, there is usually
a limited theoretical or quantitative basis for represent-
ing a causal or underlying mechanism. Thus, we rely on
statistical approximations that roughly describe what we
observe, but may not represent a causal or underlying
mechanism. Second, despite the deluge of data that is
available today, much of this information does not con-
cern what we want to forecast directly. For example, if
we wish to predict the GDP next quarter, we may have
an enormous amount of daily stock market data available,
but no daily data on expenditures on goods and services.
Third, what we are trying to forecast is often affected
by the forecasts themselves. For example, central banks
might forecast next year’s housing price index but then
raise interest rates as a result, thus leading the index to
be lower than the forecast. Such feedback does not occur
in astronomical or weather forecasts.
For these reasons, social science forecasts are unlikely
ever to be as accurate as forecasts in the physical sciences,
and the potential for improvements in accuracy is some-
what limited. Nevertheless, increases in computing power
and a better understanding of how to separate signal
from noise should lead to some improvements in forecast
accuracy. However, this does not appear to have been
the case, at least for macroeconomic forecasting (Fildes &
Stekler, 2002; Heilemann & Stekler, 2013; Stekler, 2007).
On the other hand, time series forecasting has im-
proved demonstrably over the last 30 years. We can mea-
sure the change through the published accuracies of fore-
casting competitions over the last 40 years, beginning
with the first Makridakis competition (Makridakis et al.,
1982), then the M3 competition (Makridakis & Hibon,
2000), and finally the recent M4 competition (Makri-
dakis, Spiliotis, & Assimakopoulos, 2018a). In measuring
the forecast accuracy improvement, we have applied the
best-performing methods from each competition to the
data from previous competitions in order to see how the
methods have improved over time.
However, these comparisons are not straightforward
because the forecast accuracy measures used were not
18 S. Makridakis, R.J. Hyndman and F. Petropoulos / International Journal of Forecasting 36 (2020) 15–28
consistent between competitions. In fact, there is still no
agreement on the best measure of the forecast accuracy.
We will therefore compare results using the MAPE (used
in the first competition), the sMAPE (used in the M3
competition) and the MASE. The M4 competition used
a weighted average of the sMAPE and MASE values. All
measures are defined and discussed by Hyndman and
Koehler (2006) and Hyndman and Athanasopoulos (2018).
In the first Makridakis competition (Makridakis et al.,
1982), the best-performing method overall (as measured
by MAPE) was simple exponential smoothing applied
to deseasonalized data, where the deseasonalization
used a classical multiplicative decomposition (Hyndman
& Athanasopoulos, 2018); this is denoted by DSES. For
non-seasonal data, DSES is equivalent to simple exponen-
tial smoothing.
In the M3 competition, the best method (as measured
by sMAPE), and which is in the public domain, was the
Theta method (Assimakopoulos & Nikolopoulos, 2000).
We applied the Theta method using the thetaf() im-
plementation from the forecast package for R (Hyndman
et al., 2018), to ensure consistent application to all data
sets.
In the M4 competition, the best-performing method
(as measured by a weighted average of sMAPE and MASE)
for which we had R code available was the FFORMA
method (Montero-Manso, Athanasopoulos, Hyndman, &
Talagala, 2020), which came second in the competition.
In addition to these methods, we also included, for com-
parison, the popular auto.arima() and ets() methods
(Hyndman & Khandakar, 2008; Hyndman, Koehler, Sny-
der, & Grose, 2002), as implemented by Hyndman et al.
(2018), along with a simple average of the forecasts from
these two methods (denoted ‘‘ETSARIMA’’). We also in-
clude two simple benchmarks: naive and naive on the
seasonally adjusted data (naive 2).
When we apply these methods to the data from all
three competitions, we can see how the forecast accuracy
has changed over time, as is shown in Table 1. Note that
the mean values of MAPE, sMAPE and MASE have been
calculated by applying the arithmetic mean across series
and horizons simultaneously. Other ways of averaging the
results can lead to different conclusions, due to greater
weights being placed on some series or horizons. It is not
always obvious from the published competition results
how these calculations have been done in the past, al-
though in the case of the M4 competition, the code has
been made public to help to avoid such confusion.
There are several interesting aspects to this compari-
son.
• DSES did well on the M1 data and is competitive
with other non-combining methods on the M3 and
M4 data according to the MAPE and sMAPE, but it
does poorly according to the MASE.
• While Theta did well on the M3 data (winner of that
competition), it is less competitive on the M1 and
M4 data.
• The most recent method (FFORMA) outperforms the
other methods on every measure for the M1 and M4
competitions, and on all but the MAPE measure for
the M3 competition.
• The ETSARIMA method (averaging the ETS and
ARIMA forecasts) is almost as good as the FFORMA
method in terms of MASE, and is easier and faster to
compute.
• The results are relatively clear-cut across all com-
petitions (in the order displayed) using the MASE
criterion, but the results are less clear with the other
accuracy criteria.
While there is some variation between periods, the good
performances of FFORMA and ETSARIMA are relatively
consistent across data sets and frequencies. Clearly,
progress in forecasting methods has been uneven, but
the recent M4 competition has helped to advance the
field considerably in several ways, including: (1) encour-
aging the development of several new methods; and (2)
providing a large set of data in order to allow detailed
comparisons of various forecasting methods over different
time granularities.
1.4. The importance of being uncertain
No forecasts are exact, and so it is important to pro-
vide some measure of the forecast uncertainty. Unless
such uncertainty is expressed clearly and unambiguously,
forecasting is not far removed from fortune-telling.
The most general approach to expressing the uncer-
tainty is to estimate the ‘‘forecast distribution’’ — the
probability distribution of future observations conditional
on the information available at the time of forecasting. A
point forecast is usually the mean (or sometimes the me-
dian) of this distribution, and a prediction interval is usu-
ally based on the quantiles of this distribution (Hyndman
& Athanasopoulos, 2018). As a consequence, forecasting
has two primary tasks:
1. To provide point forecasts which are as accurate as
possible;
2. To specify or summarise the forecast distribution.
Until relatively recently, little attention was paid to fore-
cast distributions, or measures of the forecast distribution
accuracy. For example, there was no measure of the dis-
tributional forecast uncertainty used in the M1 and M3
competitions, and it is still rare to see such measures used
in Kaggle competitions.
1.4.1. Prediction interval evaluation
The simplest approach to summarising the uncertainty
of a forecast distribution is to provide one or more pre-
diction intervals with a specified probability coverage.
However, it is well-known that these intervals are often
narrower than they should be (Hyndman et al., 2002);
that is, that the actual observations fall inside the inter-
vals less often than the nominal coverage implies. For
example, the 95% prediction intervals for the ETS and
ARIMA models applied to the M1 and M3 competition
data, obtained using the automatic procedures in the fore-
cast package for R, yield coverage percentages that are
as low as 76.8%, and are never higher than 95%. Progress
has been made in this area too, though, with the recent
FFORMA method (Montero-Manso et al., 2020) providing
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Table 1
Comparing the best method from each forecasting competition against each other and against benchmark methods.
M1 competition M3 competition M4 competition
Method MAPE sMAPE MASE MAPE sMAPE MASE MAPE sMAPE MASE
FFORMA 15.9 14.4 1.28 18.4 12.6 1.11 14.3 11.8 1.17
ETSARIMA 17.4 15.3 1.32 18.7 13.1 1.13 14.9 12.3 1.22
ETS 17.7 15.6 1.35 18.7 13.3 1.16 15.6 12.8 1.27
ARIMA 18.9 16.3 1.38 19.8 14.0 1.18 15.2 12.7 1.24
Theta 20.3 16.8 1.41 17.9 13.1 1.16 14.7 12.4 1.30
DSES 17.0 15.4 1.46 19.2 13.9 1.31 15.2 12.8 1.41
Naive 2 17.7 16.6 1.52 22.3 15.8 1.40 16.0 13.5 1.44
Naive 21.9 19.4 1.79 24.3 16.6 1.50 17.5 14.7 1.70
an average coverage of 94.5% for these data sets. Fig. 1
shows the coverages for nominal 95% prediction intervals
for each method and forecast horizon when applied to the
M1 and M3 data. ARIMA models do particularly poorly
here.
It is also evident from Fig. 1 that there are possible dif-
ferences between the two data sets, with the percentage
coverages being lower for the M1 competition than for the
M3 competition.
There are at least three reasons for standard statistical
models’ underestimations of the uncertainty.
1. Probably the biggest factor is that model uncer-
tainty is not taken into account. The prediction
intervals are produced under the assumption that
the model is ‘‘correct’’, which clearly is never the
case.
2. Even if the model is specified correctly, the param-
eters must be estimated, and also the parameter
uncertainty is rarely accounted for in time series
forecasting models.
3. Most prediction intervals are produced under the
assumption of Gaussian errors. When this assump-
tion is not correct, the prediction interval coverage
will usually be underestimated, especially when the
errors have a fat-tailed distribution.
In contrast, some modern forecasting methods do not
use an assumed data generating process to compute pre-
diction intervals. Instead, the prediction intervals from
FFORMA are produced using a weighted combination of
the intervals from its component methods, where the
weights are designed to give an appropriate coverage
while also taking into account the length of the interval.
Coverage is important, but it is not the only require-
ment for good prediction intervals. A good prediction
interval will be as small as possible while maintaining the
specified coverage. Winkler proposed a scoring method
for enabling comparisons between prediction intervals
that takes into account both the coverage and the width
of the intervals. If the 100(1 − α)% prediction interval for
time t is given by [lt , ut ], and yt is the observation at time
t, then the Winkler (1972) score is defined as the average
of
W (lt , ut , yt) =
⎧⎨⎩
(ut − lt) lt < yt < ut
(ut − lt) + 2α (lt − yt) yt < lt
(ut − lt) + 2α (yt − ut) yt > ut .
This penalises both for wide intervals (since ut − lt will be
large) and for non-coverage, with observations that are
well outside the interval being penalised more heavily.
However, although this was proposed in 1972, it has re-
ceived very little use until recently, when a scaled version
of it was used in the M4 competition. The lower the
score, the better the forecasts. For a discussion of some of
the problems with interval scoring, see Askanazi, Diebold,
Schorfheide, and Shin (2018).
1.4.2. Forecast distribution evaluation
To the best of our knowledge, the only forecasting
competitions that have evaluated whole forecast distri-
butions have been the GEFCom2014 and GEFCom2017
energy forecasting competitions (Hong et al., 2016). Both
used percentile scoring as an evaluation measure.
For each time period t throughout the forecast horizon,
the participants provided percentiles qi,t , where i = 1, 2,








(1 − i/100)(qi,t − yt ) yt < qi,t
(i/100)(yt − qi,t ) yt ≥ qi,t .
This score is then averaged over all percentiles and all
time periods in order to evaluate the full predictive den-
sity. If the observations follow the forecast distribution,
then the average score will be the smallest value possible.
If the observations are more spread out or deviate from
the forecast distribution in some other way, then the
average score will be higher. Other distribution scoring
methods are also available (Gneiting & Raftery, 2007).
Without a history of forecast distribution evaluation, it
is not possible to explore how this area of forecasting has
improved over time. However, we recommend that future
forecast evaluation studies include forecast distributions,
especially in areas where the tails of the distribution are
of particular interest, such as in energy and finance.
2. What we know
2.1. On explaining the past versus predicting the future
Forecasting is about predicting the future, but this can
only be done based on information from the past, which
raises the issue of how the most appropriate information
and the corresponding model for predicting the future
should be selected. For a long period, and for lack of a
better alternative, it was believed that such model should
be chosen according to how well it could explain, that
is, fit, the available past data (somewhat like asking a
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Fig. 1. Actual coverages achieved by nominal 95% prediction intervals.
historian to predict the future). For instance, in the pre-
sentation of their paper to the Royal Statistical Society in
London, Makridakis and Hibon (1979) had difficulty ex-
plaining their findings that single exponential smoothing
was more accurate than the Box–Jenkins approach and
that a combination of methods was more accurate than
the individual methods being combined. Theoretically,
with the correct model and assuming that the future is
the same as the past, these findings would not be possible.
However, this theoretical postulate does not necessarily
hold, because the future could be quite different from the
past. Both the superiority of combining and the higher
accuracy of exponential smoothing methods relative to
ARIMA models were proven again in the M1 and M2 Com-
petitions. However, some statisticians were still unwilling
to accept the empirical evidence, arguing that theory was
more important than empirical competitions, as was ex-
pressed powerfully by Priestley, who stated that ‘‘we must
resist the temptation to read too much into the results of
the analysis’’ (Makridakis & Hibon, 1979, p. 127).
The debate ended with the M3 Competition (Makri-
dakis & Hibon, 2000), with its 3003 time series. Once
again, the results showed the value of combining and the
superior performances of some simpler methods (such as
the Theta method) in comparison to other, more compli-
cated methods (most notably one particular neural net-
works application). Slowly but steadily, this evidence is
being accepted by a new breed of academic forecasters
and well-informed practitioners who are interested in
improving the accuracy of their predictions. Moreover, the
accuracy of ARIMA models has improved considerably in
the M3 and M4 competitions, surpassing those of expo-
nential smoothing methods when model selection was
conducted using Akaike’s information criterion (Akaike,
1977).
As a result, the emphasis has shifted from arguing
about the value of competitions to learning as much as
possible from the empirical evidence in order to improve
the theoretical and practical aspects of forecasting. The
M4 Competition, which is covered in detail in this special
issue, is the most recent evidence of this fundamental
shift in attitudes toward forecasting and the considerable
learning that has been taking place in the field. A number
of academic researchers have guided this shift within uni-
versities. Determined practitioners from companies like
Uber, Amazon, Google, Microsoft and SAS, among others,
present their advances every year in the International
Symposium on Forecasting (ISF). They are focused on
improving the forecasting accuracy and harnessing its
benefits, while also being concerned about measuring the
uncertainty in their predictions.
2.2. On the (non)existence of a best model
Many forecasting researchers have been on a quest
to identify the best forecasting model for each particular
case. This quest is often viewed as the ‘‘holy grail’’ in
forecasting. While earlier studies investigated the concept
of aggregate selection (Fildes, 1989), meaning selecting
one model for all series within a data set, more recent
studies have suggested that such an approach can only
work for highly homogeneous data sets. In fact, as Fildes
and Petropoulos (2015) showed, if we had some way
of identifying correctly beforehand which model would
perform best for each series, we could observe savings of
up to 30% compared to using the best (but same) model
on all series.
Approaches for the individual selection of the best
model for each series (or even for each series/horizon
combination) include information criteria (Hyndman et al.,
2002), validation and cross-validation approaches (Tash-
man, 2000), approaches that use knowledge obtained
from the data to find temporary solutions to the prob-
lems faced (Fildes & Petropoulos, 2015), approaches based
on time series features and expected errors (Petropou-
los, Makridakis, Assimakopoulos, & Nikolopoulos, 2014;
Wang, Smith-Miles, & Hyndman, 2009), and
approaches based on expert rules (Adya, Collopy, Arm-
strong, & Kennedy, 2001). However, all of these
approaches are limited with regard to their input: they
are attempting to identify the best model for the future
conditional on information from the past. However, as
the previous section highlighted, explaining the past is
not the same as predicting the future. When dealing with
real data, no well-specified ‘‘data generation processes’’
exist. The future might be completely different from the
past, and the previous ‘‘best’’ models may no longer be
appropriate. Even if we could identify the best model, we
would be limited by the need to estimate its parameters
appropriately.
In fact, there exist three types of uncertainties when
dealing with real forecasting situations: model uncer-
tainty, parameter uncertainty and data uncertainty
(Petropoulos et al., 2018). In practice, such uncertainties
are dealt with by combining models/methods. As George
Box put it, ‘‘all models are wrong, but some are useful’’.
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Again and again, combinations have been proved to ben-
efit the forecasting accuracy (Clemen, 1989; Makridakis,
1989; Timmermann, 2006), while also decreasing the
variance of the forecasts (Hibon & Evgeniou, 2005), thus
rendering operational settings more efficient. Current ap-
proaches to forecast combinations include, among oth-
ers, combinations based on information criteria (Kolassa,
2011), the use of multiple temporal aggregation levels
(Andrawis, Atiya, & El-Shishiny, 2011; Athanasopoulos,
Hyndman, Kourentzes, & Petropoulos, 2017; Kourentzes,
Petropoulos, & Trapero, 2014), bootstrapping for time
series forecasting (Bergmeir, Hyndman, & Benítez, 2016)
and forecast pooling (Kourentzes, Barrow, & Petropoulos,
2019).
Approaches based on combinations have dominated
the rankings in the latest instalment of the M Com-
petitions. It is important to highlight the fact that one
element of the success of forecast combinations is the
careful selection of an appropriate pool of models and
their weights. One explanation for the good performance
of combinations is that the design of the M competi-
tions requires the nature and history of the series to
be concealed. This reduces the amount of background
information that can be applied to the forecasting prob-
lem and may give combinations an advantage relative
to models that are selected individually by series. In
fact, as Fildes and Petropoulos (2015) have shown, model
selection can outperform forecast combinations in certain
situations, such as when a dominant method exists, or
under a stable environment. Finally, the evidence in the
M4 results suggests that hybrid approaches, which are
based on combining simple time series techniques with
modern machine-learning methods at a conceptual level
(rather than a forecast level), perform very well.
2.3. On the performance of machine learning
The hype publicizing the considerable achievements in
artificial intelligence (AI) also extends to machine learning
(ML) forecasting methods. There were high expectations
that hedge funds that utilised ML techniques would out-
perform the market (Satariano & Kumar, 2017). However,
new evidence has shown that their track record is mixed,
even though their potential is enormous (Asmundsson,
2018).
Although some publications have claimed to show ex-
cellent accuracies of ML forecasting methods, very of-
ten they have not been being compared against sensible
benchmarks. For stock-market data, for example, it is
essential to include a naive benchmark, yet often this is
not done (see for example Wang & Wang, 2017). In addi-
tion, some studies claim high levels of accuracy by hand-
selecting examples where the proposed method happens
to do well. Even when a reasonably large set of data
is used for the empirical evaluation and the time series
have not been chosen specifically to favour the proposed
approach, it is essential to consider the statistical signif-
icance of any comparisons made. Otherwise, conclusions
can be drawn from random noise (Pant & Starbuck, 1990).
One advantage of large forecasting competitions is that
they provide a collection of data against which new meth-
ods can be tested, and for which published accuracy re-
sults are available. The data sets are also large enough
that statistically significant results should be able to be
achieved for any meaningful improvements in forecast
accuracy.
One disadvantage is that the series are a heteroge-
neous mix of frequencies, lengths and categories, so that
there may be some difficulty in extracting from the raw
results the circumstances under which individual meth-
ods shine or fall down.
In time series forecasting, the hype has been moder-
ated over time as studies have shown that the application
of ML methods leads to poor performances in compari-
son to statistical methods (though some ML supporters
still argue about the validity of the empirical evidence).
We are neither supporters nor critics of either approach
over the other, and we believe that there is consider-
able overlap between the statistical and ML approaches
to forecasting. Moreover, they are complementary in the
sense that ML methods are more vulnerable to excessive
variance, while statistical ones are more vulnerable to
higher bias. At the same time, the empirical evidence to
date shows a clear superiority in accuracy of the statis-
tical methods in comparison to ML ones when applied
to either individual time series or large collections of
heterogeneous time series. In a study using the 1045
monthly M3 series (those utilised by Ahmed, Atiya, Ga-
yar, & El-Shishiny, 2010) that consisted of more than
81 observations, Makridakis, Spiliotis, and Assimakopou-
los (2018b) found, using accepted practices to run the
methods, that the most accurate ML methods were less
accurate than the least accurate statistical one. More-
over, fourteen of the ML methods were less accurate than
naive 2.
ML methods did not do well in the M4 Competition
either, with most of them doing worse than the naive
2 benchmark (for more details see Makridakis, Spiliotis,
& Assimakopoulos, 2020). We believe that it is essential
to figure out the reasons for such poor performances of
the ML methods. One possibility is the relatively large
number of parameters associated with ML methods com-
pared to statistical methods. Another is the number of
important choices that are related to the design of ML,
which are usually made using validation data, as there
is no standardised ML approach. The time series used
in these competitions are generally not particularly long,
with a few hundred observations at most. This is simply
not sufficient for building a complicated nonlinear, non-
parametric forecasting model. Even if the time series are
very long (at least a few thousand observations), there are
difficulties with data relevance, as the dynamics of the
series may have changed, and the early part of the series
may bias the forecasting results.
Machine learning methods have done well in time
series forecasting when forecasting an extensive collec-
tion of homogeneous data. For example, Amazon uses
deep learning neural networks to predict product sales
(Salinas et al., 2017; Wen, Torkkola, Narayanaswamy, &
Madeka, 2017) by exploiting their vast database of the
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sales histories of related products, rather than building a
separate model for the sales of each product.
We expect that future research efforts will work to-
wards making these methods more accurate. Both the
best and second-best methods of the M4 Competition
used ML ideas to improve the accuracy, and we would
expect that additional, innovative notions would be found
in the future to advance their utilisation.
3. What we are not sure about
3.1. On the prediction of recessions/booms/non-stable envi-
ronments
One area of forecasting that has attracted a consider-
able amount of attention is that of extreme events, which
include but are not limited to economic recessions/booms
and natural disasters. Such events have a significant im-
pact from a socioeconomic perspective, but also are noto-
riously tricky to predict, with some being ‘‘black swans’’
(events with no known historical precedent).
Take as an example the great recession of 2008. At the
end of December 2007, Business Week reported that only
2 out of 34 forecasters predicted a recession for 2008.
Even when the symptoms of the recession became more
evident, Larry Kudlow (an American financial analyst and
the Director of the National Economic Council under the
Trump administration) insisted that there was no reces-
sion. Similarly, the Federal Open Market Committee failed
to predict the 2008 recession (Stekler & Symington, 2016).
Interestingly, after the recession, most economic analysts,
victims of their hindsight, were able to provide detailed
explanations of and reasons behind the recession, while
the few ‘‘prophets’’ who did indeed predict the great
recession were unable to offer equally good predictions
for other extreme events, as if their prophetic powers had
been lost overnight.
Two recent studies have taken some first steps towards
predicting market crashes and bubble bursts. Gresnigt,
Kole, and Franses (2015) model financial market crashes
as seismic activity and create medium-term probability
predictions which consequently feed an early warning
system. Franses (2016) proposes a test for identifying
bubbles in time series data, as well as to indicate whether
a bubble is close to bursting.
3.2. On the performances of humans versus models
Judgment has always been an integral input to the
forecasting process. Earlier studies focused on the com-
parative performances of judgmental versus statistical
forecasts, when judgment was used to produce fore-
casts directly. However, the results of such studies have
been inconclusive. For instance, while Lawrence, Edmund-
son, and O’Connor (1985) and Makridakis et al. (1993)
found that unaided human judgment can be as good
as the best statistical methods from the M1 forecast-
ing competition, Carbone and Gorr (1985) and Sanders
(1992) found judgmental point forecasts to be less accu-
rate than statistical methods. The reason for these results
is the fact that well-known biases govern judgmental
forecasts, such as the tendency of forecasters to dampen
trends (Lawrence, Goodwin, O’Connor, & Önkal, 2006;
Lawrence & Makridakis, 1989), as well as anchoring and
adjustment (O’Connor, Remus, & Griggs, 1993) and the
confusion of the signal with noise (Harvey, 1995; Reimers
& Harvey, 2011). On the other hand, statistical meth-
ods are consistent and can handle vast numbers of time
series seamlessly. Still, judgment is the only option for
producing estimates for the future when data are not
available.
Judgmental biases apply even to forecasters with do-
main or technical expertise. As such, the expert knowl-
edge elicitation (EKE, Bolger & Wright, 2017) literature
has examined many ways of designing methods so as
to reduce the danger of biased judgments from experts.
Strategies for mitigating humans’ biases include decom-
posing the task (Edmundson, 1990; Webby, O’Connor, &
Edmundson, 2005), offering alternative representations
(tabular versus graphical formats, see Harvey & Bolger,
1996) and providing feedback (Petropoulos, Goodwin, &
Fildes, 2017).
The previous discussion has focused on judgmental
forecasts that are produced directly. However, the judg-
ment in forecasting can also be applied in the form of
interventions (adjustments) to the statistical forecasts
that are produced by a forecasting support system. Model-
based forecasts are adjusted by experts frequently in op-
erations/supply chain settings (Fildes, Goodwin, Lawrence,
& Nikolopoulos, 2009; Franses & Legerstee, 2010). Such
revised forecasts often differ significantly from the statis-
tical ones (Franses & Legerstee, 2009); however, small ad-
justments are also observed, and are linked with a sense
of ownership of the forecasters (Fildes et al., 2009). Ex-
perts tend to adjust upwards more often than downwards
(Franses & Legerstee, 2010), which can be attributed to
an optimism bias (Trapero, Pedregal, Fildes, & Kourentzes,
2013), but such upwards adjustments are far less effective
(Fildes et al., 2009). The empirical evidence also suggests
that experts can reduce the forecasting error when the
adjustment size is not too large (Trapero et al., 2013).
Another point in the forecasting process at which judg-
ment can be applied is that of model selection. Assum-
ing that modern forecasting software systems offer many
alternative models, managers often rely on their judg-
ment in order to select the most suitable one, rather
than pushing the magic button labelled ‘‘automatic selec-
tion’’ (which selects between models based on algorith-
mic/statistical approaches, for example, using an informa-
tion criterion). The study by Petropoulos et al. (2018) is
the first to offer some empirical evidence on the perfor-
mance of judgmental versus algorithmic selection. When
the task follows a decomposition approach (selection of
the applicable time series patterns, which is then trans-
lated to the selection of the respective forecasting model),
on average the judgmental selection is as good as se-
lecting via statistics, while humans more often have the
advantage of avoiding the worst of the candidate models.
Two strategies are particularly useful for enhancing
the judgmental forecasting performance. The first strategy
is a combination of statistics and judgment (Blattberg &
Hoch, 1990). This can be applied intuitively to cases where
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statistical and judgmental forecasts have been produced
independently, but it works even in cases where the man-
agerial input could be affected by the model output, as
in judgmental adjustments. Several studies have shown
that adjusting the adjustments can lead not only to an
improved forecasting performance (Fildes et al., 2009;
Franses & Legerstee, 2011), but also to a better inventory
performance (Wang & Petropoulos, 2016). The second
strategy is the mathematical aggregation of the individual
judgments that have been produced independently, also
known as the ‘‘wisdom of crowds’’ (Surowiecki, 2005).
In Petropoulos, Kourentzes, Nikolopoulos, and Siemsen’s
(2018) study of model selection, the aggregation of the
selections of five individuals led to a forecasting perfor-
mance that was significantly superior to that of algorith-
mic selection.
In summary, we observe that, over time, the research
focus has shifted from producing judgmental forecasts
directly to adjusting statistical forecasts and selecting be-
tween forecasts judgmentally. The value added to the
forecasting process by judgment increases as we shift
further from merely producing a forecast judgmentally.
However, given the exponential increase in the num-
ber of series that need to be forecast by a modern organ-
isation (for instance, the number of stock keeping units
in a large retailer may very well exceed 100,000), it is
not always either possible or practical to allocate the
resources required to manage each series manually.
3.3. On the value of explanatory variables
The use of exogenous explanatory variables would
seem an obvious way of improving the forecast accuracy.
That is, rather than relying only on the history of the
series that we wish to forecast, we can utilise other
relevant and available information as well.
In some circumstances, the data from explanatory vari-
ables can improve the forecast accuracy significantly. One
such situation is electricity demand forecasting, where
current and past temperatures can be used as explanatory
variables (Ben Taieb & Hyndman, 2014). The electric-
ity demand is highly sensitive to the ambient tempera-
ture, with hot days leading to the use of air-conditioning
and cold days leading to the use of heating. Mild days
(with temperatures around 20 ◦C) tend to have the lowest
electricity demand.
However, often the use of explanatory variables is not
as helpful as one might imagine. First, the explanatory
variables themselves may need to be forecast. In the case
of temperatures, good forecasts are available from mete-
orological services up to a few days ahead, and these can
be used to help forecast the electricity demand. However,
in many other cases, forecasting the explanatory variables
may be just as difficult as forecasting the variable of
interest. For example, Ashley (1988) argues that the fore-
casts of many macroeconomic variables are so inaccurate
that they should not be used as explanatory variables.
Ma, Fildes, and Huang (2016) demonstrate that including
competitive promotional variables as explanatory vari-
ables for retail sales is of limited value, but that adding
focal variables leads to substantial improvements over
time series modelling with promotional adjustments
A second problem arises due to the assumption that
the relationships between the forecast variable and the
explanatory variables will continue. When this assump-
tion breaks down, we face model misspecification.
A third issue is that the relationship between the fore-
cast variable and the explanatory variables needs to be
strong and estimated precisely (Brodie, Danaher, Kumar,
& Leeflang, 2001). If the relationship is weak, there is little
value in including the explanatory variables in the model.
It is possible to assess the value of explanatory vari-
ables and to test whether either of these problems is
prevalent by comparing the forecasts from three separate
approaches: (1) a purely time series approach, ignoring
any information that may be available in explanatory
variables; (2) an ex-post forecast, building a model using
explanatory variables but then using the future values of
those variables when producing an estimate; and (3) an
ex-ante forecast, using the same model but substituting
the explanatory variables with their forecasts.
Athanasopoulos, Hyndman, Song, and Wu (2011) car-
ried out this comparison in the context of tourism data, as
part of the 2010 tourism forecasting competition. In their
case, the explanatory variables included the relative CPI
and prices between the source and destination countries.
Not only were the purely time series forecasts better
than the models that included explanatory variables, but
also the ex-ante forecasts were better than the ex-post
forecasts. This suggests that the relationships between
tourism numbers and the explanatory variables changed
over the course of the study. Further supporting this
conclusion is the fact that time-varying parameter models
did better than fixed parameter models. However, the
time-varying parameter models did not do as well as the
purely time series models, showing that the forecasts of
the explanatory variables were also problematic.
To summarise, explanatory variables can be useful, but
only under two specific conditions: (1) when there are
accurate forecasts of the explanatory variables available;
and (2) when the relationships between the forecasts and
the explanatory variables are likely to continue into the
forecast period. Both conditions are satisfied for electricity
demand, but neither condition is satisfied for tourism
demand. Unless both conditions are satisfied, time series
forecasting methods are better than using explanatory
variables.
4. What we don’t know
4.1. On thin/fat tails and black swans
Another misconception that prevailed in statistical ed-
ucation for a long time was that normal distributions
could approximate practically all outcomes/events, in-
cluding the errors of statistical models. Furthermore, there
was little or no discussion of what could be done when
normality could not be assured. Now, it is accepted that
Gaussian distributions, although extremely useful, are of
limited value for approximating some areas of application
(Cooke, Nieboer, & Misiewicz, 2014; Makridakis & Taleb,
2009), and in particular those that refer to forecast error
distributions, describing the uncertainty in forecasting.
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This paper has emphasised the critical role of uncertainty
and expressed our conviction that providing forecasts
without specifying the levels of uncertainty associated
with them amounts to nothing more than fortune telling.
However, it is one thing to identify uncertainty, but quite
another to get prepared to face it realistically and effec-
tively. Furthermore, it must be clear that it is not possible
to deal with uncertainty without either incurring a cost
or accepting lower opportunity benefits.
Table 2 distinguishes four types of events, follow-
ing Rumsfeld’s classification. In Quadrant I, the known/
knowns category, the forecasting accuracy depends on
the variance (randomness) of the data, and can be as-
sessed from past information. Moreover, the uncertainty
is well-defined and can be measured, usually follow-
ing a normal distribution with thin tails. In Quadrant II
(known/unknowns), which includes events like reces-
sions, the accuracy of forecasting cannot be assessed,
as the timing of a recession, crisis or boom cannot be
known and their consequences can vary widely from one
recession to another. The uncertainty in this quadrant
is considerably greater, while its implications are much
harder to assess than those in Quadrant I. It is char-
acterised by fat tails, extending well beyond the three
sigmas of the normal curve. A considerable problem that
amplifies the level of uncertainty is that, during a reces-
sion, a forecast, such as the sales of a product, moves from
Quadrant I to Quadrant II, which increases the uncertainty
considerably and makes it much harder to prepare to face
it.
Things can get still more uncertain in Quadrant III, for
two reasons. First, judgmental biases influence events;
for instance, people fail to address obviously high-impact
dangers before they spiral out of control (Wucker, 2016).
Second, it is not possible to predict the implications of
self-fulfilling and self-defeating prophecies for the actions
and reactions of market players. This category includes
strategy and other important decisions where the forecast
or the anticipation of an action or plan can modify the
future course of events, mainly when there is a zero-sum
game where the pie is fixed. Finally, in Quadrant IV, any
form of forecasting is difficult by definition, requiring the
analysis and evaluation of past data to determine the ex-
tent of the uncertainty and risk involved. Taleb, the author
of Black Swan (Taleb, 2007), is more pessimistic, stating
that the only way to be prepared to face black swans
is by having established antifragile strategies that would
allow one to dampen the negative consequences of any
black swans that may appear. Although other writers have
suggested insurance and robust strategies for coping with
uncertainty and risk, Taleb’s work has brought renewed
attention to the issue of highly improbable, high-stakes
events and has contributed to making people aware of the
need to be prepared to face them, such as, for instance,
having enough cash reserves to survive a significant fi-
nancial crisis like that of 2007–08 or having invested in
an adequate capacity to handle a boom.
What needs to be emphasised is that dealing with
any uncertainty involves a cost. The uncertainty that the
sales forecast may be below the actual demand can be
dealt with by keeping enough inventories, thus avoiding
the risk of losing customers. However, such inventories
cost money to keep and require warehouses in which to
be stored. In other cases, the uncertainty that a share
price may decrease can be dealt with through diversi-
fication, buying baskets of stocks, thereby reducing the
chance of large losses; however, one then foregoes profits
when individual shares increase more than the average.
Similarly, antifragile actions such as keeping extra cash
for unexpected crises also involve opportunity costs, as
such cash could instead have been invested in productive
areas to increase income and/or reduce costs and increase
profits.
The big challenge, eloquently expressed by Bertrand
Russell, is that we need to learn to live without the
support of comforting fairy tales; he also added that it
is perhaps the chief achievement of philosophy ‘‘to teach
us how to live without certainty, and yet without being
paralysed by hesitation’’. An investor should not stop
investing merely because of the risks involved.
4.2. On causality
Since the early years, humans have always been try-
ing to answer the ‘‘why’’ question: what are the causal
forces behind an observed result. Estimating the statistical
correlation between two variables tells us little about the
cause–effect relationship between them. Their association
may be due to a lurking (extraneous) variable, unknown
forces, or even chance. In the real world, there are just too
many intervening, confounding and mediating variables,
and it is hard to assess their impacts using traditional
statistical methods. Randomised controlled trials (RCTs)
have been long considered the ‘‘gold standard’’ in design-
ing scientific experiments for clinical trials. However, as
with every laboratory experiment, RCTs are limited in the
sense that, in most cases, the subjects are not observed
in their natural environment (medical trials may be an
exception). Furthermore, RCTs may be quite impossible in
cases such as the comparison of two national economic
policies.
An important step towards defining causality was taken
by Granger (1969), who proposed a statistical test for
determining whether the (lagged) values of one time
series can be used for predicting the values of another
series. Even if it is argued that Granger causality only
identifies predictive causality (the ability to predict one
series based on another series), not true causality, it
can still be used to identify useful predictors, such as
promotions as explanatory variables for future sales.
Structural equation models (SEMs) have also been be-
ing used for a long time for modelling the causal re-
lationships between variables and for assessing unob-
servable constructs. However, the linear-in-nature SEMs
make assumptions with regard to the model form (which
variables are included in the equations) and the distribu-
tion of the error. Pearl (2000) extends SEMs from linear
to nonparametric, which allows the total effect to be
estimated without any explicit modelling assumptions.
Pearl and Mackenzie (2018) describe how we can now
answer questions about ‘how’ or ‘what if I do’ (interven-
tion) and ‘why’ or ‘what if I had done’ (counterfactuals).
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Table 2
Accuracy of forecasting, type of uncertainty and extent of risk.
Uncertainty Known I. Known/known
(Law of large numbers, independent events,
e.g. sales of toothbrushes, shoes or beer)
Forecasting: Accurate (depending on variance)
Uncertainty: Thin-tailed and measurable
Risks: Manageable, can be minimized
III. Unknown/known
(Cognitive biases, strategic moves, e.g. Uber re-introducing AVs
in a super-competitive industry)
Forecasting: Accuracy depends on several factors
Uncertainty: Extensive and hard to measure
Risk: Depends on the extent of biases, strategy success
Unknown II. Known/unknown
(Unusual/special conditions, e.g. the effects of
the 2007/2008 recession on the economy)
Forecasting: Inaccuracy can vary considerably
Uncertainty: Fat-tailed, hard to measure
Risks: Can be substantial, tough to manage
IV. Unknown/unknown (black swans)
(Black swans: Low-probability, high-impact events, e.g. the
implications of a total collapse in global trade)
Forecasting: Impossible
Uncertainty: Unmeasurable




Two tools have been instrumental in these developments.
One is a qualitative depiction of the model that includes
the assumptions and relationships among the variables
of interest; such graphical depictions are called causal
diagrams (Pearl, 1995). The second is the development of
the causal calculus that allows for interventions by modi-
fying a set of functions in the model (Huang & Valtorta,
2012; Pearl, 1993; Shpitser & Pearl, 2006). These tools
provide the means of dealing with situations in which
confounders and/or mediators would render the methods
of traditional statistics and probabilities impossible. The
theoretical developments of Pearl and his colleagues are
yet to be evaluated empirically.
4.3. On luck (and other factors) versus skills
A few lucky investing decisions are usually sufficient
for stock-pickers to come to be regarded as stock market
gurus. Similarly, a notoriously bad weather, economic or
political forecast is sometimes sufficient to destroy the
career of an established professional. Unfortunately, the
human mind tends to focus on the salient and vibrant
pieces of information that make a story more interesting
and compelling. In such cases, we should always keep in
mind that eventually ‘‘expert’’ stock-pickers’ luck will run
out. Similarly, a single inaccurate forecast does not make
one a bad forecaster. Regression to the mean has taught
us that an excellent landing for pilot trainees is usually
followed by a worse one, and vice versa. The same applies
to the accuracy of forecasts.
Regardless of the convincing evidence of regression
to the mean, we humans tend to attribute successes to
our abilities and skills, but failures to bad luck. Moreover,
in the event of failures, we are very skilful at inventing
stories, theories and explanations for what went wrong
and why we did actually know what would have hap-
pened (hindsight bias). The negative relationship between
actual skill/expertise and beliefs in our abilities has also
been examined extensively, and is termed the Dunning-
Kruger effect: the least-skilled people tend to over-rate
their abilities.
Tetlock, Gardner, and Richards (2015), in their Super-
forecasting book, enlist the qualities of ‘‘superforecasters’’
(individuals that consistently have higher skill/luck ratios
than regular forecasters). Such qualities include, among
others, a 360◦ ‘‘dragonfly’’ view, balancing under- and
over-reacting to information, balancing under- and over-
confidence, searching for causal forces, decomposing the
problem into smaller, more manageable ones, and looking
back to evaluate objectively what has happened. How-
ever, even superstars are allowed to have a bad day from
time to time.
If we are in a position to provide our forecasters with
the right tools and we allow them to learn from their
mistakes, then their skills will improve over time. We
need to convince companies not to operate under a one-
big-mistake-and-you’re-out policy (Goodwin, 2017). The
performances of forecasters should be tracked and moni-
tored over time and should be compared to those of other
forecasts, either statistical or judgmental. Also, linking
motivation with an improved accuracy directly could aid
the forecast accuracy further (Fildes et al., 2009); regard-
less of how intuitive this argument might be, there are
plenty of companies that still operate with motivational
schemes that directly contradict the need for accuracy, as
is the case where bonuses are given to salesmen who have
exceeded their forecasts.
Goodwin (2017) suggests that, instead of evaluating
the outcomes of forecasts based solely on their resulting
accuracies, we should turn our attention to evaluating
the forecasting process that was used to produce the
forecasts in the first place. This is particularly useful when
evaluating forecasts over time is either not feasible or
impractical, as is the case with one-off forecasts such as
the introduction of a significant new product. In any case,
even if the forecasting process is designed and imple-
mented appropriately, we should still expect the forecasts
to be ‘off’ in about 1 instance out of 20 assuming 95%
prediction intervals, a scenario which is not that remote.
5. Conclusions
Although forecasting in the hard sciences can attain
remarkable levels of accuracy, such is not the case in the
social domains, where large errors are possible and all
predictions are uncertain. Forecasts are indispensable for
decisions of which the success depends a good deal on the
accuracy of these forecasts. This paper provides a survey
of the state of the art of forecasting in social sciences
that is aimed at non-forecasting experts who want to
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be informed on the latest developments in the field, and
possibly to figure out how to improve the accuracy of
their own predictions.
Over time, forecasting has moved from the domains of
the religious and the superstitious to that of the scientific,
accumulating concrete knowledge that is then used to im-
prove its theoretical foundation and increase its practical
value. The outcome has been enhancements in forecast
accuracy and improvements in estimating the uncertainty
of its predictions. A major contributor to the advancement
of the field has been the empirical studies that have pro-
vided objective evidence for comparing the accuracies of
the various methods and validating different hypotheses.
Despite all its challenges, forecasting for social settings
has improved a lot over the years.
Our discussions above suggest that more progress
needs to be made in forecasting under uncertain condi-
tions, such as unstable economic environments or when
fat tails are present. Also, despite the significant advances
that have been achieved in research around judgment,
there are still many open questions, such as the condi-
tions under which judgment is most likely to outperform
statistical models and how to minimise the negative ef-
fects of judgmental heuristics and biases. More empirical
studies are needed to better understand the added value
of collecting data on exogenous variables and the do-
mains in which their inclusion in forecasting models is
likely to provide practical improvements in forecasting
performances. Another research area that requires rigor-
ous empirical investigation is that of causality, and the
corresponding theoretical developments.
These are areas that future forecasting competitions
can focus on. We would like to see future competitions
include live forecasting tasks for high-profile economic
series. We would also like to see more competitions ex-
ploring the value of exogenous variables. Competitions
focusing on specific domains are also very important. In
the past, we have seen competitions on neural networks
(Crone, Hibon, & Nikolopoulos, 2011), tourism demand
(Athanasopoulos et al., 2011) and energy (Hong, Pinson, &
Fan, 2014; Hong et al., 2016; Hong, Xie, & Black, 2019); we
would also like to see competitions that focus on intermit-
tent demand and retailing, among others. Furthermore,
it would be great to see more work done on forecasting
one-off events, in line with the Good Judgment.2 project.
Last but not least, we need a better understanding of how
improvements in forecast accuracy translate into ‘profit’,
and how to measure the cost of forecast errors.
Acknowledgments
Thanks to Pablo Montero-Manso for providing the
FFORMA forecasts for the M1 and M3 data.
References
Adya, M., Collopy, F., Armstrong, J. S., & Kennedy, M. (2001). Automatic
identification of time series features for rule-based forecasting.
International Journal of Forecasting, 17(2), 143–157.
2 https://www.gjopen.com/
Ahmed, N. K., Atiya, A. F., Gayar, N. E., & El-Shishiny, H. (2010). An
empirical comparison of machine learning models for time series
forecasting. Econometric Reviews, 29(5–6), 594–621.
Akaike, H. (1977). On entropy maximization principle. In Application of
Statistics (pp. 27–41). North-Holland Publishing Company.
Andrawis, R. R., Atiya, A. F., & El-Shishiny, H. (2011). Combina-
tion of long term and short term forecasts, with application to
tourism demand forecasting. International Journal of Forecasting,
27(3), 870–886.
Armstrong, J. S. (2006). Findings from evidence-based forecasting:
methods for reducing forecast error. International Journal of
Forecasting, 22(3), 583–598.
Ashley, R. (1988). On the relative worth of recent macroeconomic
forecasts. International Journal of Forecasting, 4(3), 363–376.
Askanazi, R., Diebold, F. X., Schorfheide, F., & Shin, M. (2018). On the
comparison of interval forecasts. Retrieved from https://www.sas.
upenn.edu/~fdiebold/papers2/Eval.pdf.
Asmundsson, J. (2018). The big problem with machine learning
algorithms. Bloomberg News Retrieved from https://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-09/the-big-problem-with-
machine-learning-algorithms.
Assimakopoulos, V., & Nikolopoulos, K. (2000). The theta model: a
decomposition approach to forecasting. International Journal of
Forecasting, 16(4), 521–530.
Athanasopoulos, G., Hyndman, R. J., Kourentzes, N., & Petropoulos, F.
(2017). Forecasting with temporal hierarchies. European Journal of
Operational Research, 262(1), 60–74.
Athanasopoulos, G., Hyndman, R. J., Song, H., & Wu, D. C. (2011). The
tourism forecasting competition. International Journal of Forecasting,
27(3), 822–844.
Ben Taieb, S., & Hyndman, R. J. (2014). A gradient boosting approach
to the Kaggle load forecasting competition. International Journal of
Forecasting, 30(2), 382–394.
Bergmeir, C., Hyndman, R. J., & Benítez, J. M. (2016). Bagging expo-
nential smoothing methods using STL decomposition and Box–Cox
transformation. International Journal of Forecasting, 32(2), 303–312.
Blattberg, R. C., & Hoch, S. J. (1990). Database models and managerial
intuition: 50% model + 50% manager. Management Science, 36(8),
887–899.
Bolger, F., & Wright, G. (2017). Use of expert knowledge to anticipate
the future: issues, analysis and directions. International Journal of
Forecasting, 33(1), 230–243.
Box, G. E. P., Jenkins, G. M., Reinsel, G. C., & Ljung, G. M. (2015). Time
series analysis: forecasting and control (5th ed.). New Jersey: Wiley.
Brodie, R. J., Danaher, P. J., Kumar, V., & Leeflang, P. S. H. (2001). Econo-
metric models for forecasting market share. In J. S. Armstrong (Ed.),
Principles of forecasting: a handbook for researchers and practitioners
(pp. 597–611). Boston, MA: Springer US.
Brown, R. G. (1959). Statistical forecasting for inventory control.
McGraw-Hill.
Brown, R. G. (1963). Smoothing, forecasting and prediction of discrete
time series. Courier Corporation.
Burton, J. (1986). Robert FitzRoy and the early history of the Mete-
orological Office. British Journal for the History of Science, 19(2),
147–176.
Camerer, C. F., Dreber, A., Forsell, E., Ho, T.-H., Huber, J., Johan-
nesson, M., et al. (2016). Evaluating replicability of laboratory
experiments in economics. Science, 351(6280), 1433–1436.
Carbone, R., & Gorr, W. L. (1985). Accuracy of judgmental forecasting
of time series. Decision Sciences, 16(2), 153–160.
Clemen, R. T. (1989). Combining forecasts: a review and annotated
bibliography. International Journal of Forecasting, 5(4), 559–583.
Cooke, R. M., Nieboer, D., & Misiewicz, J. (2014). Fat-tailed distributions:
data, diagnostics and dependence. John Wiley & Sons.
Crone, S. F., Hibon, M., & Nikolopoulos, K. (2011). Advances in
forecasting with neural networks? Empirical evidence from the
NN3 competition on time series prediction. International Journal of
Forecasting, 27(3), 635–660.
Dewald, W. G., Thursby, J. G., & Anderson, R. G. (1986). Replication
in empirical economics: the Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
project. The American Economic Review, 76(4), 587–603.
Edmundson, R. H. (1990). Decomposition; a strategy for judgemental
forecasting. Journal of Forecasting, 9(4), 305–314.
Fildes, R. (1989). Evaluation of aggregate and individual forecast
method selection rules. Management Science, 35(9), 1056–1065.
S. Makridakis, R.J. Hyndman and F. Petropoulos / International Journal of Forecasting 36 (2020) 15–28 27
Fildes, R., Goodwin, P., Lawrence, M., & Nikolopoulos, K. (2009).
Effective forecasting and judgmental adjustments: an empiri-
cal evaluation and strategies for improvement in supply-chain
planning. International Journal of Forecasting, 25(1), 3–23.
Fildes, R., & Petropoulos, F. (2015). Simple versus complex selection
rules for forecasting many time series. Journal of Business Research,
68(8), 1692–1701.
Fildes, R., & Stekler, H. (2002). The state of macroeconomic forecasting.
Journal of Macroeconomics, 24(4), 435–468.
Franses, P. H. (2016). A simple test for a bubble based on growth and
acceleration. Computational Statistics & Data Analysis, 100, 160–169.
Franses, P. H., & Legerstee, R. (2009). Properties of expert adjust-
ments on model-based SKU-level forecasts. International Journal of
Forecasting, 25(1), 35–47.
Franses, P. H., & Legerstee, R. (2010). Do experts’ adjustments on
model-based SKU-level forecasts improve forecast quality? Journal
of Forecasting, 29(3), 331–340.
Franses, P. H., & Legerstee, R. (2011). Combining SKU-level sales
forecasts from models and experts. Expert Systems with Applications,
38(3), 2365–2370.
Freedman, D. H. (2010). Lies, damned lies, and medical science. The
Atlantic Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/
archive/2010/11/lies-damned-lies-and-medical-science/308269/.
Gneiting, T., & Raftery, A. E. (2007). Strictly proper scoring rules, predic-
tion, and estimation. Journal of the American Statistical Association,
102(477), 359–378.
Goodwin, P. (2017). Forewarned: a sceptic’s guide to prediction. Biteback
Publishing.
Granger, C. W. J. (1969). Investigating causal relations by econometric
models and cross-spectral methods. Econometrica, 37(3), 424–438.
Gresnigt, F., Kole, E., & Franses, P. H. (2015). Interpreting financial
market crashes as earthquakes: a new early warning system for
medium term crashes. Journal of Banking & Finance, 56, 123–139.
Halleio, E. (1704). Astronomiae cometicae synopsis, Autore Edmundo
Halleio apud Oxonienses. Geometriae Professore Saviliano, & Reg.
Soc. S. Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London Series
I, 24, 1882–1899.
Harvey, N. (1995). Why are judgments less consistent in less
predictable task situations? Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes, 63(3), 247–263.
Harvey, N., & Bolger, F. (1996). Graphs versus tables: effects of data pre-
sentation format on judgemental forecasting. International Journal
of Forecasting, 12(1), 119–137.
Heilemann, U., & Stekler, H. O. (2013). Has the accuracy of macroeco-
nomic forecasts for Germany improved? German Economic Review,
14(2), 235–253.
Hibon, M., & Evgeniou, T. (2005). To combine or not to combine:
selecting among forecasts and their combinations. International
Journal of Forecasting, 21, 15–24.
Hong, T., Pinson, P., & Fan, S. (2014). Global energy forecast-
ing competition 2012. International Journal of Forecasting, 30(2),
357–363.
Hong, T., Pinson, P., Fan, S., Zareipour, H., Troccoli, A., & Hyndman, R.
J. (2016). Probabilistic energy forecasting: global energy forecasting
competition 2014 and beyond. International Journal of Forecasting,
32(3), 896–913.
Hong, T., Xie, J., & Black, J. (2019). Global energy forecasting competi-
tion 2017: hierarchical probabilistic load forecasting. International
Journal of Forecasting (in press).
Huang, Y., & Valtorta, M. (2012). Pearl’s calculus of intervention is
complete. arXiv preprint arXiv:1206.6831.
Hyndman, R. J., & Athanasopoulos, G. (2018). Forecasting: principles and
practice (2nd ed.). OTexts.
Hyndman, R., Athanasopoulos, G., Bergmeir, C., Caceres, G., Chhay, L.,
O’Hara-Wild, M., et al. (2018). Forecast: forecasting functions
for time series and linear models. Retrieved from http://pkg.
robjhyndman.com/forecast.
Hyndman, R. J., & Khandakar, Y. (2008). Automatic time series forecast-
ing: the forecast package for R. Journal of Statistical Software, 27(3),
1–22.
Hyndman, R. J., & Koehler, A. B. (2006). Another look at measures
of forecast accuracy. International Journal of Forecasting, 22(4),
679–688.
Hyndman, R. J., Koehler, A. B., Snyder, R. D., & Grose, S. (2002). A
state space framework for automatic forecasting using exponen-
tial smoothing methods. International Journal of Forecasting, 18(3),
439–454.
Ioannidis, J. P. A. (2005). Why most published research findings are
false. PLoS Medicine, 2(8), e124.
Kistler, R., Kalnay, E., Collins, W., Saha, S., White, G., Woollen, J., et al.
(2001). The NCEP–NCAR 50-year reanalysis: monthly means CD-
ROM and documentation. Bulletin of the American Meteorological
Society, 82(2), 247–268.
Kolassa, S. (2011). Combining exponential smoothing forecasts using
akaike weights. International Journal of Forecasting, 27(2), 238–251.
Kourentzes, N., Barrow, D., & Petropoulos, F. (2019). Another look at
forecast selection and combination: evidence from forecast pooling.
International Journal of Production Economics, 209, 226–235.
Kourentzes, N., Petropoulos, F., & Trapero, J. R. (2014). Improving
forecasting by estimating time series structural components across
multiple frequencies. International Journal of Forecasting, 30(2),
291–302.
Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 32(2), 311–328.
Lawrence, M. J., Edmundson, R. H., & O’Connor, M. J. (1985). An
examination of the accuracy of judgmental extrapolation of time
series. International Journal of Forecasting, 1(1), 25–35.
Lawrence, M., Goodwin, P., O’Connor, M., & Önkal, D. (2006). Judg-
mental forecasting: a review of progress over the last 25 years.
International Journal of Forecasting, 22(3), 493–518.
Lawrence, M., & Makridakis, S. (1989). Factors affecting judgmental
forecasts and confidence intervals. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 43(2), 172–187.
Ma, S., Fildes, R., & Huang, T. (2016). Demand forecasting with high
dimensional data: the case of SKU retail sales forecasting with
intra- and inter-category promotional information. European Journal
of Operational Research, 249(1), 245–257.
Makridakis, S. (1986). The art and science of forecasting: an assessment
and future directions. International Journal of Forecasting, 2(1),
15–39.
Makridakis, S. (1989). Why combining works? International Journal of
Forecasting, 5(4), 601–603.
Makridakis, S., Andersen, A., Carbone, R., Fildes, R., Hibon, M.,
Lewandowski, R., et al. (1982). The accuracy of extrapolation (time
series) methods: results of a forecasting competition. Journal of
Forecasting, 1(2), 111–153.
Makridakis, S., Chatfield, C., Hibon, M., Lawrence, M., Mills, T., Ord, K.,
et al. (1993). The M2-competition: a real-time judgmentally based
forecasting study. International Journal of Forecasting, 9(1), 5–22.
Makridakis, S., & Hibon, M. (1979). Accuracy of forecasting: an em-
pirical investigation. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series A,
142(2), 97–145.
Makridakis, S., & Hibon, M. (2000). The M3-competition: results, con-
clusions and implications. International Journal of Forecasting, 16(4),
451–476.
Makridakis, S., Spiliotis, E., & Assimakopoulos, V. (2018a). The M4 com-
petition: results, findings, conclusion and way forward. International
Journal of Forecasting, 34(4), 802–808.
Makridakis, S., Spiliotis, E., & Assimakopoulos, V. (2018b). Statistical and
machine learning forecasting methods: concerns and ways forward.
PloS One, 13(3), e0194889.
Makridakis, S., Spiliotis, E., & Assimakopoulos, V. (2020). The M4
competition: 100,000 time series and 61 forecasting methods.
International Journal of Forecasting 36(1), 54–74.
Makridakis, S., & Taleb, N. (2009). Decision making and planning under
low levels of predictability. International Journal of Forecasting,
25(4), 716–733.
Mente, A., & Yusuf, S. (2018). Evolving evidence about diet and health.
The Lancet Public Health, 3(9), e408–e409.
Micha, R., Wallace, S. K., & Mozaffarian, D. (2010). Red and pro-
cessed meat consumption and risk of incident coronary heart
disease, stroke, and diabetes mellitus: a systematic review and
meta-analysis. Circulation, 121(21), 2271–2283.
Montero-Manso, P., Athanasopoulos, G., Hyndman, R. J., & Tala-
gala, T. S. (2020). FFORMA: feature-based forecast model averaging.
International Journal of Forecasting, 36(1), 86–92.
28 S. Makridakis, R.J. Hyndman and F. Petropoulos / International Journal of Forecasting 36 (2020) 15–28
O’Connor, M., Remus, W., & Griggs, K. (1993). Judgemental forecast-
ing in times of change. International Journal of Forecasting, 9(2),
163–172.
Pant, P. N., & Starbuck, W. H. (1990). Innocents in the forest: forecasting
and research methods. Journal of Management, 16(2), 433–460.
Pearl, J. (1993). Comment: graphical models, causality and intervention.
Statistical Science, 8(3), 266–269.
Pearl, J. (1995). Causal diagrams for empirical research. Biometrika,
82(4), 669–688.
Pearl, J. (2000). Causality: models, reasoning, and inference. Cambridge
University Press.
Pearl, J., & Mackenzie, D. (2018). The book of why: the new science of
cause and effect. Allen Lane.
Petropoulos, F., Goodwin, P., & Fildes, R. (2017). Using a rolling
training approach to improve judgmental extrapolations elicited
from forecasters with technical knowledge. International Journal of
Forecasting, 33(1), 314–324.
Petropoulos, F., Hyndman, R. J., & Bergmeir, C. (2018). Exploring
the sources of uncertainty: why does bagging for time series
forecasting work? European Journal of Operational Research, 268(2),
545–554.
Petropoulos, F., Kourentzes, N., Nikolopoulos, K., & Siemsen, E. (2018).
Judgmental selection of forecasting models. Journal of Operations
Management, 60, 34–46.
Petropoulos, F., Makridakis, S., Assimakopoulos, V., & Nikolopoulos, K.
(2014). ‘Horses for courses’ in demand forecasting. European Journal
of Operational Research, 237, 152–163.
Reimers, S., & Harvey, N. (2011). Sensitivity to autocorrelation in judg-
mental time series forecasting. International Journal of Forecasting,
27(4), 1196–1214.
Saha, S., Moorthi, S., Wu, X., Wang, J., Nadiga, S., Tripp, P., et al. (2014).
The NCEP climate forecast system version 2. Journal of Climate,
27(6), 2185–2208.
Salinas, D., Flunkert, V., & Gasthaus, J. (2017). DeepAR: probabilistic
forecasting with autoregressive recurrent networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1704.04110.
Sanders, N. R. (1992). Accuracy of judgmental forecasts: a comparison.
Omega, 20(3), 353–364.
Satariano, A., & Kumar, N. (2017). The massive hedge fund betting on
ai. Bloomberg News Retrieved from https://www.bloomberg.com/
news/features/2017-09-27/the-massive-hedge-fund-betting-on-ai.
Schnaars, S. P. (1989). Megamistakes: forecasting and the myth of rapid
technological change (29th ed.). The Free Press.
Scott, M. (2015). Delphi: a history of the center of the ancient world.
Princeton University Press.
Shpitser, I., & Pearl, J. (2006). Identification of conditional interventional
distributions. In Proceedings of the 22nd conference on uncertainty in
artificial intelligence, UAI 2006 (pp. 437–444).
Stekler, H. O. (2007). The future of macroeconomic forecasting: under-
standing the forecasting process. International Journal of Forecasting,
23(2), 237–248.
Stekler, H., & Symington, H. (2016). Evaluating qualitative forecasts:
the FOMC minutes, 2006–2010. International Journal of Forecasting,
32(2), 559–570.
Surowiecki, J. (2005). The wisdom of crowds: why the many are smarter
than the few (new ed.). Abacus.
Taleb, N. N. (2007). The black swan: the impact of the highly improbable.
Penguin.
Tashman, L. J. (2000). Out-of-sample tests of forecasting accuracy:
an analysis and review. International Journal of Forecasting, 16(4),
437–450.
Tetlock, P. E. (2006). Expert political judgment: how good is it? how can
we know? (new ed.). Princeton University Press.
Tetlock, P., Gardner, D., & Richards, J. (2015). Superforecasting: the
art and science of prediction (unabridged ed.). Audible Studios on
Brilliance.
Timmermann, A. (2006). Forecast combinations. In G. Elliott, C.
W. J. Granger, & A. Timmermann (Eds.), Handbook of economic
forecasting: vol. 1, (pp. 135–196). Elsevier.
Trapero, J. R., Pedregal, D. J., Fildes, R., & Kourentzes, N. (2013).
Analysis of judgmental adjustments in the presence of promotions.
International Journal of Forecasting, 29(2), 234–243.
Wang, X., & Petropoulos, F. (2016). To select or to combine? The
inventory performance of model and expert forecasts. International
Journal of Productions Research, 54(17), 5271–5282.
Wang, X., Smith-Miles, K., & Hyndman, R. (2009). Rule induction for
forecasting method selection: meta-learning the characteristics of
univariate time series. Neurocomputing, 72(10–12), 2581–2594.
Wang, J., & Wang, J. (2017). Forecasting stochastic neural network
based on financial empirical mode decomposition. Neural Networks,
90, 8–20.
Webby, R., O’Connor, M., & Edmundson, B. (2005). Forecasting support
systems for the incorporation of event information: an empirical
investigation. International Journal of Forecasting, 21(3), 411–423.
Wen, R., Torkkola, K., Narayanaswamy, B., & Madeka, D. (2017). A
multi-horizon quantile recurrent forecaster. arXiv preprint arXiv:
1711.11053.
Winkler, R. L. (1972). A decision-theoretic approach to interval es-
timation. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 67(337),
187–191.
Wucker, M. (2016). The gray Rhino: How to recognize and act on the
obvious dangers we ignore. St. Martin’s Press.
Spyros Makridakis was until recently the Rector of the Neapolis
University of Pafos and an Emeritus Professor at INSEAD. He is now
taking on the role as Director of the Institute for The Future (IFF) at
the University of Nicosia in Cyprus. He has held teaching and research
positions with several institutions: as a research fellow with IIM Berlin,
an ICAME fellow at Stanford and a visiting scholar at MIT and Harvard.
Mr. Makridakis has authored, or co-authored, 24 books including
Forecasting, Planning and Strategy for the 21st Century (The Free Press),
Forecasting: Methods and Applications, 3rd ed. and Forecasting Methods
For Management, 5th ed.. He has also published more than 120 articles
and book chapters and was the founding chief editor of the Journal of
Forecasting and the International Journal of Forecasting. He has been the
Chairman of the Board of Lamda Development and the Vice Chairman
and board member of more than a dozen companies.
Rob J. Hyndman is Professor of Statistics in the Department of
Econometrics and Business Statistics, Monash University, Australia. He
was Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of Forecasting from
2005-2018. His research interests include business analytics, machine
learning, forecasting, demography, computational statistics, and time
series. He has held academic positions at Monash University, the Uni-
versity of Melbourne, Australian National University and Colorado State
University. He is an elected member of the International Statistical
Institute.
Fotios Petropoulos is Associate Professor at the School of Management
of the University of Bath, Associate Editor of the International Journal
of Forecasting and the Forecasting Support Systems Editor of Foresight.
His research expertise lies in behavioural aspects of forecasting and
improving the forecasting process, applied in the context of business
and supply chain. He is the co-founder of the Forecasting Society
(www.forsoc.net).
